3/27/2023 0 Comments Freedom life insurance![]() Woodall, 348 So.2d 1377 (Ala.1977), contends that the payment of her premiums was her damage. We note that Freedom Life and Cunningham's summary-judgment motion requested that the trial court “enter summary judgment in their favor on complaint, and each and every count and claim contained therein.” Freedom Life and Cunningham also argued in their motion that Caldwell could not prove an essential element of her claim, specifically, damage they argued that she had suffered no damage because her premium rate had not changed.Ĭaldwell, relying on Boswell v. Caldwell argues only that summary judgment was improper as to count three of her complaint because, she states, count three was never argued or addressed in the briefs filed in support of the summary-judgment motion and, thus, she “was not given adequate notice and opportunity to present evidence and argument in opposition to summary judgment on the negligence/wantonness count.” Caldwell filed a response in opposition to the motion.Īfter a hearing, the trial court entered a summary judgment “as to all counts.” Caldwell appealed to the supreme court, which transferred the case to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.Ĭaldwell makes no argument as to the fraudulent-misrepresentation and suppression counts. Freedom Life and Cunningham also filed a summary-judgment motion, along with the depositions of Caldwell and Cunningham and a brief in support of the summary-judgment motion. Specifically, Caldwell contended that “Cunningham, while acting as an agent for Freedom Life, fraudulently stated that the premiums could not and would not change under the policy.” Caldwell also contended that Freedom Life and Cunningham “suppressed material facts from which include, but are not limited to, that under the policy she purchased, could change the premium rates.” In count three of her complaint, Caldwell alleged that Freedom Life was negligent or wanton in its hiring, training, and/or supervision of Cunningham.įreedom Life and Cunningham filed answers, denying the allegations. ![]() In counts one and two of her complaint, Caldwell alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and suppression on the part of Freedom Life and Cunningham. However, Caldwell admitted that while she was paying premiums to Freedom Life her premium rate did not go up. In her deposition, Caldwell testified that she stopped paying the premiums and sued because she had read her policy and had discovered that although Freedom Life could not raise the premiums on an individual policy, it could change premium rates on a class basis. After paying the premiums for approximately 11 months, Caldwell stopped paying the premiums and, thereafter, filed a three-count complaint against Freedom Life and Cunningham. Thereafter, Caldwell paid $26.25 per month in premiums. Caldwell's initial payment for the policy was $32.25. In 1995, Caldwell purchased a hospital-insurance policy from Freedom Life Insurance Company of America (“Freedom Life”), through its agent Morris Cunningham. ![]() The plaintiff, Debra Caldwell, appeals, contending that the summary judgment was erroneous as to count three of her complaint. On May 1, 1998, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendants as to all counts. Brooks of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellees. FREEDOM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA and Morris Cunningham.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |